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Comment
GO PHISH: CIRCUIT SPLIT IN POLICY INTERPRETATION FOR SOCIAL
ENGINEERING FRAUD LOSSES CREATES AMBIGUITY FOR INSURERS
AND INSUREDS
GABRIELLA SCOTT*
“The development of technology will leave only one problem: the
infirmity of human nature.”1
I.

UNCHARTED WATERS: INSURERS AND COURTS HIT A SNAG IN LINE OF
PRECEDENT WITH SOCIAL ENGINEERING FRAUD

“I need your help with a last-minute transaction,” the email read, sent to a new
employee in a company’s large finance department.2 The employee read on, realizing
that the message bore the signature, company logo, and email address of her CEO.3
Somewhat startled that she would be singled out among her peers for such an
important task, the employee’s hand lingered over the phone to contact her
supervisor as she read the details of the client’s financial institution and the large
sum of money to be wired.4
* J.D. Candidate 2021, Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law; B.A. 2018,
University of Kentucky. I would like to dedicate this Comment to my family for their constant
love and support. I also would like to thank all of the teachers and professors who have helped
me grow as a writer over the years; namely, Kristi Spayd, Debbie Hudson, Dr. Bruce Holle, and
Professor Diane Pennys Edelman. Finally, I would like to thank my friends, who have brightened
even the toughest of law school days, and everyone on Villanova Law Review who helped with this
Comment.
1. KARL KRAUS, HALF-TRUTHS & ONE-AND-A-HALF TRUTHS: SELECTED APHORISMS OF
KARL KRAUS 123 (Harry Zohn ed. & trans., Univ. of Chi. Press 1990) (1976). Kraus, a satirical
Austrian writer during World War I, did not live to see the rise of world-altering technology
intertwined with modern everyday life; yet, this pansophical statement serves as an ominous
prediction of the manner in which computers and contemporary technology have surpassed human
intellect and reliability in many ways. See generally Wilma Abeles Iggers, KARL KRAUS: A VIENNESE
CRITIC OF THE TWENTIETH CENTRY (1967).
2. See generally David S. Wilson et al., Social Engineering Fraud in the Context of Computer and Funds
Transfer Fraud Coverages, FIDELITY & SURETY COMM. NEWSL. (ABA, Chicago, Ill.), Fall 2016, at 13
(describing common social engineering fraud schemes). Although the scenario described here is
fictional, it is indicative of a typical social engineering fraud scheme categorized as the “executive
impersonation scam,” characterized by a spoof or similar domain email sent by a high-ranking
individual in the company to a lower ranked employee “relating to a ‘top secret’ acquisition, merger
or emergency situation.” Id.
3. See generally Kunal Pandove et al., Email Spoofing, 5 INT. J. OF COMPUT. APPLICATIONS 27,
27–28 (2010) (describing methods used by fraudsters to send phishing emails either from
compromised email account or those which are “spoofed” to appear as though they are sent from
official account). Because fraudulent emails can bear the exact address and signature of the sender
whose credentials are imitated either by compromising the sender’s email or by spoofing, it is often
difficult for the recipient to spot a phishing email. See id. at 27–28.
4. See generally Justin Pritchard, How Wire Transfers Work: Sending and Receiving, BALANCE
https://www.thebalance.com/bank-wire-transfer-basics-315444 [https://perma.cc/AK3S-CB47]
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The employee stopped, however, when she reached the last line: “This is
extremely time-sensitive, and due to an error on my part this did not go through on
the correct date. If you could, please, keep this between us.” 5 Although the
company had a specific verification protocol to follow prior to a transfer of this sum,
the employee felt that the email explained the situation and required her secrecy.6
Following orders from her superior, the employee input the information and
completed the transfer.7
Only after the employee irrevocably wired $300,000 to a criminal’s bank
account did she realize that a fraudster had spoofed the CEO’s email account and
sent them the message.8 To make matters worse, she was not the only employee
targeted.9 Four other new employees that received the same email also fell for the
scheme, resulting in a combined total loss of $1.2 million. 10
Unfortunately, fraudulent schemes like the fictional scenario described here are
on the rise and are increasingly targeting a wide range of corporations. 11 Ironically,
(last updated May 19, 2020) (explaining how wire transfers work). The immutability of wire
transfers explains why they are commonly used in fraudulent schemes. See id.
5. For further discussion of the various trends and schemes in social engineering fraud, see
supra note 2.
6. See generally Wilson, supra note 2, at 13 (“The financial institution’s employee is induced by
email, phone or fax to wire client funds to a ‘new’ account. Verification procedures are either
absent or not followed, and the funds are typically unrecoverable.”).
7. See Scott L. Schmookler & Christopher M. Kahler, Social Engineering: Is the Manipulation of
Humans A Computer Fraud?, 22 FIDELITY L.J. 1, 15 (2016) (explaining why social engineering fraud
schemes in which criminals impersonate employee’s superior are particularly successful). As in the
fictional scenario presented in the text, this article describes why these schemes can successfully
target multiple employees in the same company. Impersonation of a superior can “appeal[] to
several of the unwitting participant’s emotions: credibility; fear of repercussions for failing to act;
adherence to the corporate structure; and, sense of importance by fulfilling an important task.” Id.
at 16.
8. See Jessica H. Park & John G. O’Neill, An Evolving Landscape: Insurance Coverage for Social
Engineering Wire-Fraud Scams, 60 DRI FOR THE DEF. 70, 70–72 (2018) (detailing anatomy of social
engineering scam). Prior to selecting the means used to contact the target of a social engineering
scam, criminals will typically gain information by “infiltrating company networks or other
channels.” Id. at 71. In the fictitious scenario presented in the text, the criminals targeted new
employees within the company, which is indicative of the knowledge often gained regarding the
company’s hierarchy to select a vulnerable target. The cited article also highlights that once a wiring
transaction has been completed, it typically cannot be retrieved. See id.
9. See Katrien Anthonis, It Can Happen to You: Social Engineering in Finance, SECURELINK (Oct.
10, 2018), https://securelink.net/en-be/insights/it-can-happen-to-you-social-engineering-infinance/ [https://perma.cc/HX94-M5B5] (describing test of social engineering fraud scheme).
This article describes a security test performed on a large financial institution in Belgium, in which
ten of the top managers were targeted through a fake social engineering scheme seeking the
managers’ credentials. See id. The article highlights the ease that those performing the study were
able to find information about the managers, their employment duties, and hobbies through “a
simple internet search.” Id. (emphasis omitted). Astoundingly, six of the ten managers fell for the
social engineering scheme. See id.
10. See Schmookler & Kahler, supra note 7 (explaining why social engineering fraud schemes
in which criminal impersonates employee’s superior are particularly successful).
11. See Henry Kenyon, Hackers Increasingly Target Financial Institutions, Carbon Black Says,
CONG. Q., Mar. 12, 2019, 2019 WL 1122058 (noting 79% of financial institutions reported an
increase in social engineering fraud); see also Schmookler & Kahler, supra note 7, at 2–4 (illustrating
recent increase in crimes which target humans rather than technology). Although social engineering
is not a new concept, “the reported number of social engineering type-schemes targeting employees
increased by 55% in 2015 and is the leading threat to organizations.” Schmookler & Kahler, supra
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due to advancements in cybersecurity measures like antivirus software and malware
protection, criminals have started to use humans to acquire funds and information
from companies.12 These schemes surpass direct hacking methods whereby the
hacker would gain access to information using malicious code and instead trick
employees into giving away money or critical information in good faith.13 Such
schemes have been categorized as “social engineering” fraud schemes. 14
Social engineering fraud schemes have enormous implications upon both the
scope of fraudulent losses suffered by companies and the future of crime and fidelity
insurance coverage litigation.15 An example of a social engineering fraud scheme is
displayed in the hypothetical scenario presented above: a criminal sends a phishing
email—“spoofed” to appear as though it is from a trusted individual—to persons
with access to funds or with specific instructions for a transaction. Fraudsters also
implement these schemes through telephone calls and fax machines. 16
Currently, most companies’ crime or fidelity insurance policies only contain
provisions for “computer fraud,” which often rely on language drafted before the
prevalence of social engineering fraud.17 In drafting policy language, underwriters
note 7, at 5 (footnote omitted).
12. See Jennifer Towne, Social Engineering: An Old Con is Becoming a New Threat, ACADIA INS.,
https://www.acadiainsurance.com/social-engineering-fraud-old-con-becoming-new-threat/
[https://perma.cc/DEY6-H7PU] (last visited Nov. 25, 2019) (noting that because social
engineering preys on good-natured employees, this type of fraud is difficult to prevent and
especially threating to businesses). As noted by the article, “[t]here is no antivirus for this” type of
threat. Id. Thus, it is especially important to have insurance to cover these types of risks because
they are extremely difficult to avoid. See id.
13. See Wilson et al., supra note 2, at 13 (explaining why fraudsters are increasingly finding it
easier to “hack” humans rather than computers). Due to the growing protections on computer
systems to protect against hackers, typically the “weakest point in an organization’s security system
is the employees themselves,” thus, explaining the increase in social engineering fraud schemes. Id.
14. See generally Christie M. Bird & Reina Dorvilier, Social Engineering Fraud: Current Trend in
Coverage for Insureds, 48 SPG BRIEF 10 (2019) (providing definition for social engineering fraud). In
addition to classifying 2018 “as the year of the social engineering fraud claim” in the fidelity
industry, this article provides a broad definition of social engineering fraud as “scams used by
criminals to trick, deceive and manipulate their victims into giving out confidential information and
funds,” which “may be carried out online, by telephone, or even in person.” Id. at 11 (first internal
quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted).
15. See Park & O’Neill, supra note 8, at 10 (detailing how social engineering fraud has evolved
in courts and insurance coverage continues to affect businesses of all types and sizes). Additionally,
this article addresses the changed landscape of insurance coverage litigation, as “courts generally
have not yet grappled with questions of coverage for social engineering losses . . . making it difficult
to predict how potential coverage arguments under those policies will be developed and resolved.”
Id.
16. For further explanation of social engineering fraud schemes and the manner in which
they are implemented, see supra notes 2–14; see also Brian Krebs, Voice Phishing Scams are Getting More
Clever,
KREBS
ON
SECURITY
(Oct.
1,
2018,
10:02
AM),
https://krebsonsecurity.com/2018/10/voice-phishing-scams-are-getting-more-clever/
[https://perma.cc/HS7Q-AT8U] (describing how voice phishing schemes or “vishing” are
growing increasingly common as social engineering fraud techniques). A common voice phishing
scheme involves criminals from a financial institution calling and stating that fraudulent
transactions have been made on a certain account, prompting the recipient of the call to give their
information to confirm their identity. See id.
17. See Melissa M. D’Alelio, One Phish, Two Phish: Developments in the World of Computer Fraud
Coverage, 48 SPG BRIEF 18, 19 (2019) (distinguishing “hacking” from “phishing” and explaining
insurance policy forms for computer coverage were intended for hacking). Furthermore, this article
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anticipated coverage of a cybercriminal’s unauthorized and direct taking of
information or funds by hacking a computer system. 18 Therefore, the language in
most standard policies for computer fraud strictly and plainly necessitates a “direct”
loss due to a “fraudulent entry” into the computer system. 19
In addition to highly specific coverage language, most applicable policies
contain exclusions that distinguish “computer fraud” from indirect methods of
fraud or theft; for example, some policies have exclusions for losses resulting from
data entry by an authorized “natural person,” such as an employee.20 Due to the
involvement and necessary manipulation of an employee in social engineering fraud,
the waters of coverage for these schemes are murky.21
Historically, insurers and courts categorized social engineering fraud as distinct
from losses covered under “computer fraud” provisions, leaving companies to bear
the impact of these losses without coverage. 22 Prior to 2018, the majority of courts
held that social engineering fraud losses were not covered under insurance
explains “that the purpose of the Computer Fraud Coverage Form is to cover instances where a
perpetrator directly hacks into an insured’s computer system and fraudulently causes—by his own
actions—a transfer of money.” Id. For more information regarding the modern phenomenon of
social engineering fraud, see infra notes 38–66 and accompanying text. To compare this to
information regarding when the Computer Fraud Coverage Form was drafted, see infra notes 77–
81 and accompanying text.
18. See John J. McDonald, Jr. et al., Computer Fraud and Funds Transfer Fraud Coverages, 14
FIDELITY L.J. 109, 111–13 (2008). This article explains that the insurance industry standard form
for computer fraud “coverage is intended to protect against third-party access” to the computer
system, rather than losses involving employees of the insured company. Id. at 112. This intent is
evidenced by multiple exclusions added to the standard policy form since its inception. See id. at
113–14.
19. See, e.g., Interactive Commc’ns Int’l Inc. v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 731 F. App’x 929, 930
(11th Cir. 2018) (holding social engineering losses did not “result directly” from computer fraud as
required by plain language of insured’s policy even though losses were perpetrated through
computers); Universal Am. Corp. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa., 37 N.E.3d 78, 82
(N.Y. 2015) (holding “fraudulent entry” in insured’s policy refers to unauthorized access into
computer system and not to content submitted by authorized users such as employees). But see,
e.g., Medidata Sols. Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 729 F. App’x 117, 119 (2d Cir. 2018) (holding sending
email manipulated to appear as though it was sent from company’s official satisfied “fraudulent
entry” of data and, thus, social engineering scheme constituted computer fraud).
20. See, e.g., Aqua Star (USA) Corp. v. Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am., 719 F. App’x 701
(9th Cir. 2018) (holding coverage for social engineering fraud loss was precluded by policy exclusion
for data entry “by a natural person”). In this case, the relevant exclusion stated that computer fraud
coverage would not apply “to loss or damages resulting directly or indirectly from the input of
Electronic Data by a natural person having the authority to enter the Insured’s Computer System,”
such as input by an employee. Id. at 702.
21. See generally Roberta Anderson, Securing Insurance for Social Engineering Exploits, 20
TORTSOURCE 12 (2018) (explaining insurers’ resistance to concede coverage for social engineering
fraud losses due to victim’s role in scheme). In this article, written to provide advice to ensure that
companies secure adequate coverage, the author warns that “[s]ocial engineering exploits present
relatively new exposures that do not tend to fit neatly into traditional forms of coverage.” Id. at 13.
For a further discussion of social engineering fraud schemes and the manner in which they are
implemented, see supra notes 2–14.
22. See, e.g., Apache Corp. v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 662 F. App’x 252, 258–59 (5th Cir. 2016)
(holding company’s social engineering losses were not covered under computer fraud provision in
crime-protection insurance policy because employee personally authorized fraudulent transfers to
criminal’s bank account). In this decision, the court reasoned that even though the crime was
initially perpetrated through an email, the email and thus use of computer was “merely incidental”
to the transfer. See id. at 258.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol65/iss6/1

4

Scott: Go Phish: Circuit Split in Policy Interpretation for Social Engin

2020]

COMMENT

5

provisions for “computer fraud” due to courts plainly interpreting language in the
insurance policies.23 These initial decisions denied coverage for companies and
favored insurers under several rationales—most notably, the opinion that computer
fraud provisions have language requiring that losses arose “directly” from the use of
a computer.24
By contrast, in social engineering fraud, an employee is involved in the chain of
events that causes the losses. Courts have historically held that the mere use of a
computer in achieving human deception did not trigger coverage.25 The solution
initially appeared to be a simple one: insurance underwriters could add social
engineering coverage as either an optional or standard endorsement to the crime or
fidelity policies insurers issue, making social engineering coverage completely
separate from computer fraud.26 To protect against this specific type of threat,
companies would either select a standard policy with a social engineering
endorsement or make sure that they added this coverage to their existing policies. 27
Recently, however, several circuit courts signaled a break from precedent and
created a circuit split over the question of whether losses from social engineering
fraud schemes are covered under virtually identical insurance provisions for
23. See Jonathan L. Schwartz & Colin B. Willmott, And Then There Was One: The Emerging Split
Over Insurance Coverage for Social Engineering Fraud Claims, FIDELITY & SURETY COMM. NEWSL. (ABA,
Chicago, Ill.), Fall 2018, at 17 (contrasting prior majority view with more recent decisions). This
analysis explains that prior to 2018, the majority of courts were “relucta[nt] to find coverage for
social engineering fraud.” Id. The authors state: “[a] maxim undergirding [the majority] approach
is that since the use of computers is ubiquitous, virtually all fraudulent conduct merely involving
the use of email could potentially be covered. In other words, the majority approach is wary to
transform a computer fraud/crime policy into a general fraud policy.” Id.
24. For a discussion of early cases that denied coverage and favored the insurers, see cases
cited supra notes 19–20.
25. See Apache, 662 F. App’x at 258 (explaining that, although email was part of scheme,
Apache employee changing account information and transferring funds leading to large financial
loss did not trigger coverage); see also Pestmaster Servs., Inc. v. Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am.,
656 F. App’x 332 (9th Cir. 2016) (holding general intent of computer fraud coverage is to be limited
to hacking incidents through unauthorized entry into computer systems). Although Pestmaster did
not involve an instance of social engineering fraud, a company executed an authorization to a
payroll company for invoices. See Pestmaster, 656 F. App’x at 333. However, the payroll company
kept the funds instead of paying the authorized invoices, and the lower court found and appellate
court affirmed that the company was not covered under their policy provision for computer fraud
because that provision would be triggered only “when someone ‘hacks’ or obtains unauthorized
access or entry to a computer to make an unauthorized transfer or otherwise uses a computer to
fraudulently cause a transfer of funds.” Pestmaster Servs., Inc. v. Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am.,
No. 13-5039-JFW, 2014 WL 3844627, at *6 (C.D. Cal. July 17, 2014), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 656
F. App’x 332 (9th Cir. 2016).
26. See Bird & Dorvilier, supra note 14, at 16 (discussing insurers making social engineering
fraud coverage available to insureds). The authors assert that, despite this attempted solution, they
do not believe the introduction of this coverage will deter insureds from seeking social engineering
coverage under computer fraud provisions. See id.
27. See Ken Kronstadt, Insurance Coverage for Social Engineering Fraud, 33 WEST. J. CORP.
OFFICERS & DIRS. LIAB. 2 (2018) (surveying recent court rulings for social engineering fraud under
computer fraud provisions and providing insights for companies looking to secure coverage). As
the article notes, due to the prevalence of social engineering fraud schemes, there is demand for
companies to secure coverage against these schemes. See id. Due to increasing demand, “some
insurers have begun to offer policy endorsements specifically providing coverage for these claims.”
Id. However, insurers have added additional sublimits and exclusions to these policy provisions.
See id.
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“computer fraud.”28 In 2018, the Second and Sixth Circuit Courts of Appeals issued
monumental decisions when they held that social engineering fraud attacks were
covered under “computer fraud” provisions using a proximate cause standard; both
courts found that a sufficient causal relationship existed between the use of a
computer and the losses suffered.29 Additionally, these decisions shifted
interpretation of various policy exclusions, such as those involving “the input of
Electronic Data by a natural person.”30
While the current trend favoring insureds may be appealing to some, courts
should return to a strict interpretation of plain policy language because the loosened
causal analyses applied in recent cases depart from the standard method of insurance
policy interpretation.31 By restricting coverage to a plain interpretation of policy
language, courts will promote cross-jurisdictional uniformity for the interpretation
of the same policy language across state lines. 32 Furthermore, interpretation of
computer fraud provisions to exclude social engineering schemes will induce
underwriters to add social engineering fraud to crime and fidelity policies, thus,
ensuring that all companies are adequately covered for these losses, regardless of
where their claim arises jurisdictionally.33 Finally, disentangling computers from the
crime or activity involved will prepare the insurance litigation field for a future in

28. See generally Schwartz & Willmott, supra note 23 (detailing emerging circuit split regarding
social engineering fraud coverage and discussing impact of the rulings).
29. See Medidata Sols. Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 729 F. App’x 117, 119 (2d Cir. 2018) (holding
spoofed emails proximately, and thus directly, caused social engineering fraud losses despite
employee involvement in unfolding of scheme). Explaining its rationale for affirming the district
court’s holding that the company’s losses were covered under “computer fraud” provision in
company’s insurance policy, the court stated:
While it is true that the Medidata employees themselves had to take action to effectuate
the transfer, we do not see their actions as sufficient to sever the causal relationship between the spoofing
attack and the losses incurred. The employees were acting, they believed, at the behest of a
high-ranking member of Medidata. And New York law does not have so strict a rule
about intervening actors as [the insurer] argues.
Id. at 119 (emphasis added); see also Am. Tooling Ctr., Inc. v. Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am., 895
F.3d 455, 462 (6th Cir. 2018) (holding company suffered “direct loss” that was “directly caused by
computer fraud” when employee signed into his company’s “banking portal and manually entered
the fraudulent banking information” sent by criminal via spoofed email).
30. See Am. Tooling, 895 F.3d at 463–65 (explaining why none of policy exclusions asserted
by insurer precluded coverage for stated claim). In analyzing the asserted exclusions, the court
found that several exclusions in the insured’s policy with similar provisions found applicable in
other jurisdictions did not preclude coverage for social engineering losses: Exclusion R, which
stated that the subject crime policy would “not apply to loss resulting directly or indirectly from
the giving or surrendering of [m]oney . . . whether or not fraudulent”; Exclusion G, which stated
that coverage would “not apply to loss or damages resulting directly or indirectly from the input of
[e]lectronic [d]ata by a natural person”; and Exclusion H, which stated that the policy does not
cover any “loss resulting directly or indirectly from forged, altered or fraudulent . . . written
instruments.” Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting Transcript of Record at 21-2, Am. Tooling, 895 F.3d
at 463–65).
31. For a further discussion of the circuit cases favoring the insured, see infra notes 108–24
and accompanying text. For a discussion of the standard method of insurance policy interpretation,
see infra notes 67–84 and accompanying text.
32. For a further discussion of how a plain interpretation of policy promotes crossjurisdictional uniformity, see infra notes 83–84 and accompanying text.
33. For a further analysis of the impact of interpreting computer fraud to exclude social
engineering, see infra notes 138–39 and accompanying text.
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which technology is ubiquitous in all aspects of corporate and daily life.34
Part II of this Comment describes common schemes used in social engineering
fraud, provides an overview of legal standards of insurance policy interpretation, and
summarizes the uniform rationales used by courts in addressing this issue prior to
the circuit split which arose in 2018. Part III of this Comment provides insight into
the rationales implemented by courts breaking from precedent and furthering the
current trend. Part IV opines that the loosened standards implemented in these
decisions will have negative effects on both insurers and insureds. Finally, Part V
predicts the impact of the circuit split on the numerous stakeholders involved in
social engineering fraud.
II. LETTING INSURERS OFF THE HOOK: PRE-CIRCUIT SPLIT CONSENSUS HOLDS
THAT SOCIAL ENGINEERING LOSSES ARE NOT “COMPUTER FRAUD”
Prior to the subject circuit split, the majority of courts distinguished losses
involving the direct hacking of a computer system from those involving employee
manipulation when determining whether insurance policies covered social
engineering fraud.35 Because human manipulation is key to social engineering fraud,
courts generally corroborated the notion that these losses were not covered under
“computer fraud” provisions.36 To understand both the initial posture and the
subsequent split, one must first understand the distinct character of social
engineering fraud, the practices used by underwriters to draft policy language, the
principles used by courts to interpret insurance policies, and the nature in which
these topics shaped the view unanimously shared by courts prior to 2018.37
A. Reeling in Employees with a Red Herring: An Overview of the Deceptive Nature of Social
Engineering Fraud
Social engineering is a term established long ago that encompasses a wide
variety of schemes used by criminals to prey on human tendencies and commit
“theft with the absence of strong-armed tactics such as violence or the threat of
violence.”38 By one commentator’s definition, social engineering is “the act of
34 For further discussion of the effects of technological developments on the insurance
industry, see infra notes 148–50 and accompanying text.
35. See, e.g., Tidewater Holdings, Inc. v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 389 F. Supp. 3d 920 (W.D.
Wash. 2019) (holding social engineering fraud losses not covered under computer fraud policy
provisions) Taylor & Lieberman v. Fed. Ins. Co., 681 F. App’x 627 (9th Cir. 2017); see also Alex
Selarnick et al., Recent Developments in Insurance Coverage, 53 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 477, 478–
85 (2018) (describing recent trends in computer fraud and social engineering fraud policy
interpretation and identifying regional trends in courts’ determination of whether coverage exists
under policy terms).
36. See, e.g., Apache Corp. v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 662 F. App’x 252, 255–59 (5th Cir. 2016)
(asserting that policy terms required losses be “direct result” of computer fraud, rather than caused
by actions of employees); see also Bird & Dorvilier, supra note 14, at 16 (discussing pre-2018 majority
view that direct entry through hacking, rather than manipulation of employees, qualifies for
coverage under computer fraud insurance provisions).
37. See generally Schmookler & Kahler, supra note 7, at 70 (explaining importance of analyzing
“the nature of the social engineering scheme to determine whether the insured suffered a covered
loss”).
38. Id. at 6 (recognizing term “social engineering” was coined in 1894 and discussing long
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influencing a person to accomplish goals that may not be in the person’s best
interest.”39 In the modern context, social engineering is commonly used to describe
the tactics employed by criminals to target information and funds from institutions
or companies.40
Typically, relevant forms of social engineering fraud fall into one of four
categories.41 These categories include: (1) client impersonation fraud, (2) the
executive impersonation scam, (3) the vendor impersonation scam, and (4) the law
firm collection scam.42 Understanding the basic plots of these schemes will aid in
understanding the factual scenarios underlying social engineering fraud claims as
well as the dangerous threat social engineering constitutes to institutions of all
sizes.43
1.

Client Impersonation Fraud

In client impersonation fraud, which usually targets banks, criminals contact a
financial institution by email, phone, or fax and impersonate a client.44 The fraudster
then informs the targeted employee that the client has a new bank account which
they would like their funds transferred to.45 After the employee wires the funds, the
employee typically cannot recover or recall the completed transfer.46 These schemes
are especially detrimental to banks because the financial institution must immediately
compensate the real client once the fraud is discovered and then attempt to recover

history of social engineering). As the article explains, the term social engineering has been used in
different capacities, such as to describe “the principle that government or other institutions could
manipulate citizens to act in a desired manner or adhere to a particular political belief.” Id.
Furthermore, the article describes that social engineering in general “encompasses all forms of
crime, such as the classic con game and Ponzi scheme,” positing that “[s]uch implementation of
manipulation and persuasion is timeless.” Id. at 6–7.
39. Id. at 7 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Lillian Ablon, The Outsider Threat,
CIPHER BRIEF (Oct. 19, 2015), https://www.thecipherbrief.com/the-outsider-threat
[https://perma.cc/CG3K-4BTE]. This somewhat ominous article, penned during the early rise of
social engineering fraud, details the potential risks involved due to such threats from outsiders
attempting to gain access to funds or information through people, and why social engineering
schemes are so successful due to human nature. See id.
40. See Schmookler & Kahler, supra note 7, at 7–14 (explaining how general definition of
social engineering fraud has now become more applicable to certain sets of fraudulent activities,
being utilized through email and phone).
41. See Wilson et al., supra note 2, at 13 (describing general categories into which social
engineering fraud schemes fall and detailing varying factors which contribute to success of each).
42. See id. (enumerating four most popular types of social engineering fraud).
43. See Schmookler & Kahler, supra note 7, at 70 (stating importance of understanding nature
and scope of these schemes to be fully cognizant of risks associated with each for insurers and
insureds).
44. See id. (discussing first step of client impersonation scam).
45. See id. (explaining purported client will typically explain that they have new account and
need their funds transferred); see also Chris Griesemer, Social Engineering: How Financial Institutions
Can Prepare for Cyber Scams, WHITLOCK CO. BLOG, http://www.whitlockco.com/socialengineering-financial-institutions-can-prepare-cyber-scams/
[https://perma.cc/HR8Y-TPUC]
(explaining how “new phishing attacks can look like a legitimate customer request” with
increasingly realistic methods).
46. For further discussion of wire transfers and why companies or financial institutions
cannot typically recover wire transfers after completion, see supra note 8.
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the funds under their own crime or fidelity insurance policy. 47
2.

Executive Impersonation Fraud

Executive impersonation fraud is particularly successful when used to
manipulate employees of larger companies with equally sizable financial
departments.48 The perpetrator impersonates a high-ranking member of the
company with whom the lower ranked employee likely does not have a close
working relationship.49 The fraudster typically contacts the employee by email or
phone in an urgent tone, enlisting the employee’s assistance with a transfer that is
“last-minute” or “secret.”50 This scheme is ordinarily successful because the
employee shirks authorization and security protocol in favor of obeying orders from
a superior.51 If a criminal can closely spoof or even gain access to the true email
account of the executive to send the fraudulent message, this scheme is especially
difficult to spot.52
3.

Vendor Impersonation Fraud

Vendor impersonation fraud is similar to the client impersonation scam;
however, the criminal instead impersonates an employee of an entity that is a vendor
of the targeted organization.53 The fraudster then states that the vendor needs to
update its banking information.54 The fraud is usually not discovered until after the
47. See generally VASCO, SOCIAL ENGINEERING: MITIGATING HUMAN RISK IN BANKING
TRANSACTIONS 3 (2015) (ebook), https://www.onespan.com/resources/social-engineeringmitigating-human-risk-banking-transactions-0 [permalink unavailable] (explaining in quarter 1 of
2015, “over 37% of phishing attacks were trading on the names of banks and financial
organizations”); see also Wilson et al., supra note 2, at 13 (noting victim must first reimburse its client
then seek reimbursement from its insurer).
48. For further discussion of how and why social engineering fraudsters target companies
with large finance departments, see supra notes 2–10.
49. See, e.g., Medidata Sols. Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 729 F. App’x 117, 118 (2d Cir. 2018)
(explaining social engineering fraud method through which criminals spoofed email to employees
to appear as though it was sent from company’s CEO).
50. See Medidata Sols., Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 268 F. Supp. 3d 471, 473 (S.D.N.Y. 2017), aff’d,
729 F. App’x 117 (2d Cir. 2018) (conveying factual scenario in which employees were induced to
complete fraudulent transfer in social engineering fraud). In the lower court decision later affirmed
by the Second Circuit, the court explained that the targeted employees “received a group email
purportedly sent from Medidata’s president stating: ‘I’m currently undergoing a financial operation
in which I need you to process and approve a payment on my behalf.’” Id. (quoting Joint Exhibit
Stipulation Exhibit 6, Medidata, 268 F. Supp 3d at 473 (ECF No. 41)); see also Wilson et al., supra
note 2, at 13 (explaining that, for executive impersonation fraud, the “pretext is often an emergency
payment relating to a ‘top secret’ acquisition, merger or emergency situation”).
51. For further discussion of the pressures upon employees to follow orders from a superior
in both factual and fictional circumstances, see supra notes 1–10 and accompanying text.
52. See, e.g., Medidata, 268 F. Supp. 3d at 473 (detailing methods used by social engineering
fraudsters to make email appear as though it was sent from company’s president in case holding
coverage under computer fraud provision). The court emphasized that “[t]he email contained the
president of Medidata’s email address in the ‘From’ field and a picture next to his name,” making
the request especially believable. Id.
53. See Wilson et al., supra note 2, at 13 (describing steps taken by criminals in perpetrating
vendor impersonation scam).
54. See id. (explaining that in vendor impersonation scam “[t]he fraudster purports to be an
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vendor realizes that the victim has not paid them but has instead wired money to
the criminal’s bank account.55
4.

Law Firm Collection Fraud

Social engineering fraud also impacts the legal profession.56 In a law firm
collection fraud scheme, the criminal contacts a lawyer asking for assistance in
settling a debt collection matter.57 This fake “client” then gives the lawyer fraudulent
information for the “debtor,” who is in fact another criminal in collusion with the
“client.”58 The lawyer then uses contact information from the “client” to collect the
money from the “debtor.”59 The “debtor” presents the lawyer with a counterfeit
check; subsequently, the “client” will ask for the funds collected.60 Believing that
the check is authentic, the lawyer transfers money from the lawyer’s own trust
account to the “client” before the check is returned as fraudulent. 61
Therefore, although these schemes often involve a computer, there are several
different methods gaining popularity among criminals that are categorized as social

employee of a legitimate vendor of the victim, and contacts the victim’s employee to request that
the vendor’s banking information be changed”).
55. See, e.g., Apache Corp. v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 662 F. App’x 252, 253–54 (5th Cir. 2016)
(describing company’s vendor impersonation social engineering fraud claim). In this case, Petrofac
was a legitimate vendor of Apache. See id. The fraudster impersonated a representative of Petrofac
and called an Apache employee, asking to update Petrofac’s account information for future
transfers. See id. Apache transferred the funds for Petrofac’s invoices in accordance with the new
bank information and, within a month, was notified that Pretrofac had not been paid. See id. at
253.
56. See generally Wilson et al., supra note 2, at 13 (emphasizing that lawyers are routinely
impacted by this type of scheme and explaining “limited scope of trust account overdraft coverage
under most lawyers’ professional liability policies”). The article explains how, in most cases, the
criminals will use the names of known entities to induce the lawyer to assume that this is a legitimate
venture and ask for assistance in settling a collections matter. See id. It is normally after the criminal
has told the lawyer they need a transfer of the check amount “urgently” and the lawyer completed
a transfer from their own trust account that the lawyer realizes the check is a counterfeit. See id.
Because most lawyers do not have adequate trust account overdraft coverage, they must obtain
crime or fidelity insurance policies to account for these risks. See id.
57. See id. (detailing steps in law firm collection fraud scheme). Because most lawyers do not
have adequate trust account overdraft coverage, they must obtain crime or fidelity insurance
policies to account for these risks. See id.
58. See, e.g., Owens, Schine & Nicola, P.C. v. Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am., No.
CV095024601S, 2011 WL 3200296, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. June 24, 2011), vacated, 2012 WL
12246940 (Conn. Super. Ct. Apr. 18, 2012) (discussing claim for coverage under computer fraud
provision in which “plaintiff entered into an agreement with the client, through the use of computer
e-mail, to collect a debt allegedly owed to the China client from a business located in Connecticut”).
Although this judgment was vacated by the Superior Court of Connecticut, it assists in explaining
the nature of a law firm collection social engineering fraud scheme. See id.
59. See Wilson et al., supra note 2, at 13 (describing next step in law firm collection fraud
scheme).
60. See Owens, 2011 WL 3200296, at *1 (explaining that “client” of attorney requested plaintiff
to wire funds to bank in South Korea before plaintiff realized check was fraudulent).
61. See id. (detailing that attorney victim to debt collection fraud scheme was informed that
check was fraudulent after sending funds to client). The court explained that the plaintiff’s bank
“subsequently debited the plaintiff’s IOLTA account because the check from the Connecticut
debtor that the plaintiff had deposited into his account was fraudulent.” Id.
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engineering fraud.62 Each involves tricking an employee into inducing the transfer
of information or funds, preying upon human tendencies, and using an indirect
method of taking information.63 Currently, there is no existing common law that
interprets policy provisions specifically for social engineering fraud.64 Although
some insurers have started to add coverage for these losses to their standard policies
or offer it as an optional coverage addition to companies, this does not remedy the
fact that most insureds are still dealing with crime or fidelity policies merely insuring
against “computer fraud.”65 Therefore, when an insurance company denies an
insured’s social engineering fraud claim and the insured then brings a claim for
coverage against the insurer, interpretation of the policy becomes a question for
courts.66
B. Opening a Policy’s Can of Words: How Courts Interpret Language in Insurance Policies
Insurance policies are elucidated by courts under state-specific common law
standards.67 If a claim involving insurance policy interpretation reaches a federal
court, those sitting in diversity will abide by the Erie doctrine and apply state law to
resolve claims implicating insurance matters. 68 Nevertheless, most states recognize
uniform principles when interpreting matters of insurance law. 69
62. See id. (noting different methods of perpetrating social engineering fraud).
63. See Schmookler & Kahler, supra note 7, at 6–21 (opining why social engineering fraud is
becoming increasingly common as alternative to direct hacking and describing different methods
used by fraudsters). As posited in the article, “[r]ather than use direct attacks on a business’s
computer system,” tricking an employee to essentially give them information, “allows the criminal
to avoid the ‘brute force’ necessary to circumvent the technological protections a corporation may
employ; such as firewalls and password security.” Id. at 7–8. As the opening to this Comment
suggests, technology has become strong in comparison to human nature making it easier to
manipulate humans. See id.
64. See Kronstadt, supra note 27 (assessing current coverage landscape where interpretation
is focused on computer fraud provisions, with courts yet to assess coverage under social
engineering fraud provisions). As the article states, “courts have yet to address coverage for social
engineering fraud under cyberliability policies, and given the lack of uniformity in policy language,
it is difficult to predict how a court will decide coverage.” Id. at 6.
65. See id. (explaining that some insurers have begun to introduce social engineering fraud
provisions to their policies). While insurers have begun to introduce this type of coverage, the
author warns that “[p]olicyholders should scrutinize the language of these endorsements,” because
the insurers may have made the coverage subject to certain exclusions and sublimits. Id.
66. For a discussion of courts’ methods of insurance policy interpretation, see infra notes 67–
84 and accompanying text.
67. See Provau v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 772 F.2d 817, 819 (11th Cir. 1985) (noting
construction of insurance contracts is governed by substantive state law); see also 16 WILLISTON ON
CONTRACTS § 49:14 (4th ed. 2019) (describing manner in which insurance policies are to be
interpreted and general model rules of interpretation). While insurance policies are interpreted as
contracts, the nature of a policy is taken into account when courts make decisions regarding policy
language. See WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS, supra. Therefore, the general policy argument is that
ambiguities in insurance policies are to be construed against the insurer. See id. Nevertheless, a
court must adhere to a plain reading of the policy language to balance this favoring of insureds with
the necessity of insurance industry uniformity in interpreting identical policy provisions. See id.
68. See generally Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (holding that when cases are
decided in federal courts using diversity jurisdiction, courts will apply state substantive law); see also
Russo v. Frasure, 371 F. Supp. 3d 586, 589–90 (E.D. Mo. 2018) (holding Missouri state substantive
law applied in insurance policy claim).
69. See generally Eric M. Larsson, Insured’s “Reasonable Expectations” as to Coverage of Insurance
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Courts treat insurance policies as contracts between the insurer and insured. 70
Thus, courts apply contractual legal principles when questions of policy
interpretation arise.71 The language used in particular types of endorsements and
exclusions, such as those contained in commercial crime policies for “computer
fraud,” tends to be universal in content and phrasing because it is based on standard
forms issued by the Insurance Services Office (ISO). 72
Most insurers rely on the standard forms issued by the ISO to create their own
policies.73 While insurers may make slight modifications to the industry-standard
provisions, the ISO is the leading authority in the insurance industry for drafting
legal language and providing risk assessments for insurers based upon the selected
language.74 Therefore, insurers make an important assumption when adopting ISO
standard forms that they can reasonably project the risks associated with each
provision and add exclusions to further calculate, with a degree of certainty, the likely
financial risk associated with each policy endorsement. 75 Insurance policies protect
policyholders from bearing the costs of what is arguably unforeseen; thus, it is crucial
for insurers to have specific policy language that allows them to prepare for the
Policy, 108 AM. JUR. 3D PROOF OF FACTS 351, Westlaw (database updated Sept. 2019) (surveying
standards used by courts throughout United States in interpreting insurance policies, and
elaborating on importance placed on contractual notion of analyzing “reasonable expectations of
the parties” and how this affects courts’ holdings and insurance industry’s decisions in response).
70. See Steven Plitt et al., 2 COUCH ON INSURANCE § 22:38 (3d ed. 2019) (explaining
insurance policy “is to be given the meaning which would be attached to the contract by a
reasonably intelligent person acquainted with all the operative usages and knowing all of the
circumstances existing prior to and at the time of the contract”); cf. Larsson, supra note 69
(discussing reasonable expectations in insurance policy interpretation).
71. See, e.g., Olin Corp v. Am. Home Assur. Co., 704 F.3d 89, 98 (2d Cir. 2012) (establishing
that, “under New York law, insurance policies are interpreted according to general rules of contract
interpretation”). This case was cited in the beginning of the analysis in Medidata Solutions, Inc. v.
Federal Insurance Co., 268 F. Supp. 3d 471, 476 (S.D.N.Y. 2017), aff’d, 729 F. App’x 117 (2d Cir.
2018); however, this notion is in accord with the insurance policy interpretation principles of each
state, and each state’s own adoption of this principle typically is cited as the opening to a court’s
analysis of an insurance policy when the issue arises. See id.
72. See McDonald et al., supra note 18, at 111 (explaining ISO’s influence in creating industry
standard forms for different types of policy coverages and the endurance of initial language used
in computer fraud policy form issued by ISO); see also Julie Davoren, What Does ISO Stand for in
Insurance?,
CHRON,
https://smallbusiness.chron.com/iso-stand-insurance-60067.html
[https://perma.cc/7WW5-2C72] (last visited Nov. 14, 2019) (explaining that ISO has been leading
organization of its kind since its inception in 1971, and is a “principal source of information for
insurance companies and provides comprehensive data, technical services, policy language, fraudidentification tools, underwriting, statistical and decision-support services to numerous players such
as the federal government, insurance industry regulators, and public- and private-sector
customers”).
73. See Marianne Bonner, Insurance Services Office (ISO), BALANCE SMALL BUS.,
https://www.thebalancesmb.com/insurance-services-office-iso-462706 [https://perma.cc/J343JRAB] (last updated May 16, 2019) (noting services and responsibilities offered by ISO and
explaining how insurers calculate rates and risk based upon data provided by ISO).
74. See id. (discussing prominence and importance of ISO in insurance policy formation).
75. See id. (asserting that data and standard policy forms provided by ISO are crucial to most
insurers when shaping their own policy forms). As this article explains, “[i]nsurers develop rates
based on projections of future losses,” and many insurers rely on the ISO to provide this risk data in
conjunction with the language in their standard forms. Id. (emphasis added); see also McDonald et
al., supra note 18 (explaining how insurers’ utilization of ISO industry standard forms has affected
development of “computer fraud” policy provisions and language contained therein).
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scope of losses and to predict how courts will interpret their policy if a claim for
coverage arises.76
The ISO industry-standard form for “computer fraud” was introduced in
1983.77 Although it has undergone several changes since its inception thirty-six years
ago, it retains language that intends to cover theft carried out by “directly” taking
information or funds through computer hacking.78 Due to the increased risks of
technological ubiquity, any changes made to the original policy since its inception
have narrowed the scope of coverage “to what is traditional theft . . . not a swindle
whereby an insured is duped to depart with its money under a belief.”79 These
exceptions are meant to prevent “computer fraud” coverage from becoming a
general fraud provision.80 Therefore, this narrow language employed by the ISO for
the “computer fraud” provision further supports the notion that the only losses
anticipated by the ISO and insurers were those in which a criminal “breaks into” the
computer system.81
Because insurers must reasonably anticipate the risks associated with the
language implemented in their policy provisions out of fairness to insureds that rely
on coverage, courts identify the parties’ reasonable expectations when the policy was
enacted.82 Additionally, when interpreting policy language, courts emphasize
76. See Bonner, supra note 73 (noting that insurers view ISO forms as containing riskpredictive language because they have been in use for decades and courts have already interpreted
the specific words and phrases within them).
77. See McDonald et al., supra note 18, at 111 (explaining how insurers utilize ISO industry
standard forms has affected development of “computer fraud” policy provisions and language
contained therein). For further discussion of the reasonable expectations of parties to an insurance
contract and how this affects courts’ interpretation of policy language, see supra note 69 and
accompanying text.
78. See id. (explaining ISO’s relevant form for computer fraud, “Commercial Crime policy
(CR 00 22 05 06)”). The standard form provides a definition for computer fraud which is included
in almost every standard policy provision for computer fraud. See id. The ISO’s form provides the
following definition: “‘Computer Fraud’ means ‘theft’ of property following and directly related to
the use of any computer to fraudulently cause a transfer of that property from inside the ‘premises’
or ‘banking premises’ to a person (other than a ‘messenger’) outside those ‘premises’ or to a place
outside those ‘premises.’” Id. at 111–12 (second emphasis added) (quoting ISO CR 00 07 (10 90)).
79. See id. at 111, 113–14 (detailing inception of ISO “computer fraud” standard coverage
form). This form has existed since 1983, which is “longer than one would likely think.” Id. at 111.
Although the form has undergone a few changes, “the same general concept first found in the ISO
form seems to have survived. The focus is on providing protection for the third-party theft of
assets through the use of a computer.” Id. at 112. The article explains that changes that have been
made have focused mostly on excluding employee actions from coverage under the policy,
regardless of whether the actions surrounding their involvement in the loss were fraudulent. See id.
at 112–13.
80. See, e.g., Pestmaster Servs., Inc. v. Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am., 656 F. App’x 332
(9th Cir. 2016) (holding computer fraud coverage is limited to hacking incidents through
unauthorized entry into computer systems, as parties could not have reasonably anticipated that
the provision would cover losses due to authorized entry).
81. See McDonald et al., supra note 18, at 112 (explaining exclusions included in original
standard ISO computer fraud policy which elucidate intent of drafters and reaffirming intent of
“direct” loss from a computer to constitute computer hacking).
82. See generally Larsson, supra note 69 (identifying how courts determine reasonable
expectations of parties to an insurance contract); see also McDonald et al., supra note 18, at 112
(enumerating exclusions for computer fraud contained in original ISO policy). The article notes
that the exclusions in the ISO computer fraud policy form are broad, “precluding coverage
regardless of the employee’s intent and regardless of when the employee acts.” McDonald et al.,
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insurance policies’ unique nature and that both insurers and insureds benefit from
cross-jurisdictional uniformity in interpreting similar provisions.83 With insurers
issuing policies containing the same language across state lines and insureds holding
policies that apply to differing geographical regions, many courts emphasize a policy
argument favoring uniformity in decisions strictly interpreting policy language. 84
C. Smooth Sailing: Pre-Circuit Split Decisions Follow Plain Interpretation of Policy Language
In earlier decisions interpreting whether coverage existed for social engineering
fraud under computer fraud insurance provisions, courts generally adhered to
reading the plain language of the policy at issue.85 Prior to courts’ recent trend of
favoring coverage for insureds after social engineering fraud losses, most courts
found that losses were not covered under the plain policy language because the
losses either did not constitute computer fraud or the claims were precluded by a
policy exclusion.86 The rationale in prior decisions is displayed by the Fifth, Ninth,
and Eleventh Circuits’ holdings, which all deny “computer fraud” coverage for social
engineering losses.87
1.

Shark in the Water: Fifth Circuit First to Address Social Engineering in Apache

The question of whether social engineering fraud victims can recover under
computer fraud insurance provisions first arose in the 2016 decision issued by the
Fifth Circuit in Apache Corp. v. Great American Insurance Co.88 In this case, fraudsters
used a vendor impersonation scam to induce Apache’s employee, through several
supra note 18, at 112. Furthermore, the article notes that the language precludes losses caused by
inside parties and “makes clear that coverage is intended to protect against third-party access.” Id.
83. See Apache Corp. v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 662 F. App’x 252, 258 (5th Cir. 2016) (explaining
court’s policy goal of promoting cross-jurisdictional uniformity for methods of insurance policy
interpretation).
84. See id. at 255–56 (asserting policy terms requiring that fraud be “direct result” of
computer fraud are not ambiguous). As stated by the Apache court, “mere disagreement about the
meaning of [an insurance policy] does not render it ambiguous,” necessitating a plain reading of
the language. Id. at 255.
85. See, e.g., Taylor & Lieberman v. Fed. Ins. Co., 681 F. App’x 627, 629 (9th Cir. 2017)
(holding plain language of “computer fraud” coverage provision did not provide coverage for social
engineering fraud losses). In this case, the policy stated that, to trigger computer fraud coverage,
the computer fraud must have involved “(1) ‘entry into’ its computer system, and (2) ‘introduction
of instructions’ that ‘propogate[d] themselves’ through its computer system.” Id. (alteration in
original). In holding that this language clearly did not include coverage for employee manipulation
rather than direct computer system hacking, the court concluded the company’s social engineering
fraud losses were not covered. See id.
86. See, e.g., Tidewater Holdings, Inc. v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 389 F. Supp. 3d 920,
923–25 (W.D. Wash. 2019) (holding social engineering losses in which fraudulent supplemental
funds transfer was initiated were not covered under “computer fraud” provision). The court
believe social engineering losses were precluded by exclusions in the main policy that were
subdivided, such that each specific exclusion referenced the policy portion limited by it. See id.
While this case was issued after the circuit split at issue arose, it exemplifies the rationale instituted
in such decisions. See id. For further discussion of the pre-circuit split majority view and examples
of rationales instituted by courts in these opinions, see supra notes 23–27 and accompanying text.
87. For further discussion of the pre-2018 majority view and the key decisions constituting
this view, see supra note 23–27 and accompanying text.
88. 662 F. App’x 252 (5th Cir. 2016).
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phone calls and emails sent from a fraudulent domain, to change the account
information of a company vendor.89 Apache then transferred money to the new
account and faced losses totaling $2.4 million.90 When Apache’s insurer, Great
American, denied its claim for coverage under the “computer fraud” provision in its
policy, Apache brought a claim against Great American. 91
The Fifth Circuit vacated the district court’s finding of coverage for Apache
and ruled that Great American did not owe coverage to its insured.92 In its decision,
the court emphasized the goal of attaining cross-jurisdictional uniformity among
courts’ interpretations of insurance policy provisions.93 In the Fifth Circuit’s view,
the mere fact that an email was involved in the chain of events, which ultimately
resulted in employees paying legitimate invoices to the wrong bank account, was not
enough to trigger coverage under the computer fraud policy provision language.94
2.

Pestmaster Proves There Are More Fish in the Sea: Ninth Circuit Decides Another
Social Engineering Fraud Claim

In 2016, the Ninth Circuit issued a similar decision in Pestmaster Services, Inc. v.
Travelers Casualty and Surety Co. of America.95 In affirming the lower court’s decision,
the Ninth Circuit found that Pestmaster’s transfer of funds to a payroll company
was not covered under its computer fraud policy provision for “fraudulently
caus[ing] a transfer” when the payroll company took the money for personal gain
without reviewing or completing invoices.96 The Ninth Circuit found that losses
89. See Melissa J. Sachs, No Coverage for $2.4 Million Transfer to Criminals, 5th Circuit Court Says:
Apache Corp. v. Great American Insurance Co., WESTLAW J. COMP. & INTERNET, Nov. 4, 2016,
at 1–2, 2016 WL 6565858 (describing decision in Apache and factual scenario underlying case).
90. See id. at 2 (explaining losses incurred by Apache); see also Apache, 662 F. App’x at 259
(explaining court’s analysis of events which unfolded in social engineering fraud at issue and found
that transfers were not covered under “computer fraud” because Apache’s employees authorized
the transfers). The court’s rationale was that, even though the fraud involved a computer, “the
computer-use was but one step in Apache’s multi-step, but flawed, process that ended in its making
required and authorized, very large invoice-payments, but to a fraudulent bank account.” Apache,
662 F. App’x at 259. The court also noted the criminals’ use of a phone in the scheme, and that
their use of a computer to further defraud the company “was in response to Apache’s refusing,
during the telephone call, to . . . transcribe the change-request.” Id. Therefore, while the court
acknowledged that contacting Apache by email through a computer was successful, the court noted
that the transfer occurred “only because, after receiving the email, Apache failed to investigate
accurately the new, but fraudulent, information provided to it.” Id. Apache elected to pay legitimate
invoices, but to the wrong bank account; therefore, “the invoices, not the email” caused the losses.
Id.
91. Id. at 254 (stating Apache’s claim for coverage due to insurer’s denial of coverage for
social engineering fraud claim under “computer fraud” provision).
92. See id. at 253, 259 (vacating district court decision and finding no coverage for claim at
issue).
93. See id. (noting interest in maintaining cross-jurisdictional uniformity and declining to
extend coverage because the transfer was not directly caused by use of computer).
94. See id. at 259 (emphasizing transfer was not caused by computer fraud as covered by
policy, but by actions of Apache employees).
95. 656 F. App’x 332 (9th Cir. 2016).
96. Id. at 333 (explaining that “Computer Fraud” provision does not cover authorized
transactions). The court in Pestmaster stated:
We interpret the phrase “fraudulently cause a transfer” to require an unauthorized
transfer of funds. When Priority 1 transferred funds pursuant to authorization from
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covered under computer fraud require an unauthorized transfer due to hacking; here,
the court found that, although the claims were fraudulent, the use of the system by
authorized users did not trigger coverage.97 As in Apache, the Ninth Circuit found
that the use of a computer in a scheme was not sufficient to bring the claim into the
scope of the computer fraud provision. 98 This decision was echoed two years later
when the Ninth Circuit found that a company’s social engineering losses due to a
vendor impersonation scheme were not covered in Aqua Star (USA) Corp. v. Travelers
Casualty & Surety Co. of America.99
3.

Running a Tight Ship: Eleventh Circuit Solidifies Narrow Interpretation of Computer
Fraud Provisions in Interactive Communications

Only a month after the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Aqua Star, the Eleventh
Circuit issued a similar opinion in Interactive Communications International, Inc. v. Great
American Insurance Co.100 Interactive Communications (InComm) is a company that
sells “chits” to consumers, which involves putting money onto reloadable debit
cards issued by an external financial institution. 101 Fraudsters, realizing that

Id.

Pestmaster, the transfer was not fraudulently caused. Because computers are used in
almost every business transaction, reading this provision to cover all transfers that
involve both a computer and fraud at some point in the transaction would convert this
Crime Policy into a “General Fraud” Policy. While Travelers could have drafted this
language more narrowly, we believe protection against all fraud is not what was intended
by this provision, and not what Pestmaster could reasonably have expected this
provision to cover.

97. See id. (explaining why incident is not covered here and noting broader interpretation of
computer fraud converts provision into general fraud policy).
98. See id. (explaining why claim is not covered in this case); see also Apache, 662 F. App’x at
258 (finding use of computer to be “merely incidental” and fraudulent events not “directly by the
computer use”).
99. 719 F. App’x 701 (9th Cir. 2018) (holding that an exclusion for input of electronic data
by a natural person excluded coverage for social engineering fraud losses). In Aqua Star, the court’s
decision largely hinged on interpretation of an exclusion meant to limit coverage for computer
fraud, and held that the exclusion at issue “unambiguously provides that the policy ‘will not apply
to loss or damages resulting directly or indirectly from the input of Electronic Data by a natural
person having the authority to enter the Insured’s Computer System’”; therefore, because the
employees were authorized to change the information and authorize the four wires, their “conduct
fits squarely within the [e]xclusion.” Id. at 702. The court noted that other exclusions “may also
bar coverage,” but did not proceed with further analysis of other exclusions. Id.
100. 731 F. App’x 929 (11th Cir. 2018).
101. See id. at 931–32 (explaining facts giving rise to claim and stating that social engineering
fraud losses were not “direct”). When analyzing directness, the court stated:
What does it mean for a result to follow a cause “directly”? Common-language and
legal dictionaries provide a clear (and essentially the same) answer. Webster’s Second, for
instance, defines “direct” to mean “(1) straight; proceeding from one point to another
in time or space without deviation or interruption; not crooked or oblique . . . ; (2)
Straightforward; going straight to the point . . . ; (3) Immediate; marked by the absence
of an intervening agency or influence; making contact or effected without an
intermediary[.]” . . .
The theme is unmistakable. In accordance with the term’s ordinary meaning, we hold
that, for purposes of InComm’s policy, one thing results “directly” from another if it
follows straightaway, immediately, and without any intervention or interruption.
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InComm’s computerized voice recognition phone system allowed the redemption
of one single chit multiple times, initiated duplicate instructions for the financial
institution to authorize transfers to debit cards, which caused InComm to incur over
$11 million in losses.102 While the Eleventh Circuit disagreed with the lower court’s
determination that the fraud did not involve computer use, it affirmed the lower
court’s holding that the losses incurred did not “result[] directly” from the use of the
computer system.103
In this determination, the court stated that “one thing results ‘directly’ from
another if it follows straightaway, immediately, and without any intervention or
interruption.”104 Because InComm authorized the transfers to the financial
institution following the call, the court could not say the losses resulted directly from
the use of a computer.105 By plainly reading the policy language, the court reached
an interpretation that matched the underwriters’ intent for the coverage provision,
namely, to cover only direct theft and to exclude employees’ intervening acts.106 In
the years following these decisions, other circuits followed this rationale either by
finding that social engineering fraud did not trigger computer fraud coverage or that
policy exclusions applied.107

Id. at 934 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
102. See id. at 931 (explaining fraudulent activity and noting losses). The court continued its
analysis by outlining each step in the social engineering fraud scheme to determine whether the loss
resulted “directly” from the use of computers. Id. at 934. First, the fraudsters manipulated
InComm’s system to enable a duplicate chit redemption where, for each redeemed chit, “a
fraudster’s debit card is immediately credited with purchasing power, but InComm’s funds are
neither transferred, nor disturbed, nor altered in any way.” Id. Second, InComm transferred money
corresponding to the redeemed chits to a bank account, where the money remained until “needed
to cover purchases made on a consumer’s debit card.” Id. Third, the fraudsters used the debit card
to make purchases, which incurred a debt from the bank account. Id. at 934–35. Fourth, the bank
transfers money from the account to the merchant. Id. at 935. InComm argued that its losses
occurred in the second step when it transferred money to the account; however, the court held:
Accordingly, InComm’s loss did not occur with the Step-2 transfer of funds to the account held by
Bancorp. Rather, the loss did not occur until—at Step 4—Bancorp actually disbursed money from the
InComm-earmarked account to pay merchants for purchases made by cardholders. That was the
point at which InComm could not recover its money. That was the point of no return.
Id. at 935 (emphasis added).
103. See id. at 933–35 (holding that, although social engineering claim constituted “use of a[]
computer” under the policy language, the losses did not result “directly” from computer fraud, as
required by policy (alteration in original)).
104. Id. at 934 (stating that “if the phrase ‘resulting directly’ has a ‘common signification’—
i.e., an ordinary meaning—then we have to find and enforce it”). In its decision, the Eleventh
Circuit explained that it is “a fundamental principle of Georgia law—and law more generally—that
words in contracts ‘generally bear their usual and common signification[.]’” Id. at 933–34 (alteration
in original) (quoting GA. CODE ANN. § 13-2-2(2) (2019)).
105. See id. at 935 (holding employees’ presence as intervening act and lack of immediacy
precluded claim for coverage because losses were not caused “directly” by computer fraud).
106. See id. at 933–35 (explaining rationale for policy interpretation and finding that intent of
“direct” in policy language required greater immediacy than indirect causation due to computer
fraud).
107. See generally Kronstadt, supra note 27 (reviewing decisions comprising pre-2018 majority
view and discussing courts rationales in making these decisions). While acknowledging that the
majority of courts making social engineering fraud coverage determinations under computer fraud
provision language have “favored insurers,” the author notes that the decisions have an “impact
on a company’s bottom line.” See id.
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III. SIT DOWN, YOU’RE ROCKING THE BOAT: A CIRCUIT SPLIT EMERGES
The judicial notion that social engineering fraud schemes and the losses
incurred by their perpetrators are not covered under insurance provisions for
computer fraud was seemingly solidified in courts throughout the United States prior
to 2018.108 Nevertheless, several 2018 decisions issued by the Second and Sixth
Circuits turned the tide in the insured’s favor. 109 These cases both determined that
social engineering fraud schemes were covered under insurance provisions for
computer fraud.
A. A Fish Out of Water: The Second Circuit Decision for Coverage in Medidata
On July 6, 2018, the Second Circuit decided Medidata Solutions, Inc. v. Federal
Insurance Co.110 This case departed from prior decisions in other circuits.111 In its
holding, the Second Circuit broadly interpreted the policy term “direct” in reference
to the insured’s computer fraud policy provision and found coverage for a social
engineering fraud claim.112 Here, criminals formatted an email to appear as though
it was from the corporation’s (Medidata’s) president to induce a transfer to the
fraudsters’ account.113 In affirming the holding issued by the district court, the
Second Circuit held that this email was a “violation of the integrity of the computer
system,” even though the criminals did not directly access Medidata’s server to send
the email to employees.114 While the finance department personnel actually
transferred the funds, the Second Circuit held that the spoofed emails were the
proximate cause of the transfers.115

108. See Schwartz & Willmott, supra note 23, at 2 (describing emerging circuit split over
coverage determinations for social engineering fraud in light of prior decisions from other circuits).
109. See generally Medidata Sols. Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 729 F. App’x 117 (2d Cir. 2018); Am.
Tooling Ctr. v. Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am., 895 F.3d 455 (6th Cir. 2018). For further
explanation of how these decisions subverted from the pre-2018 consensus, see infra notes 110–24
and accompanying text.
110. 729 F. App’x 117 (2d Cir. 2018).
111. See Michael S. Levine & Latosha M. Ellis, Year in Review: Top Insurance Cases of 2018,
WESTLAW J. ENVTL., Feb. 27, 2019, 2019 WL 615838 (discussing Second Circuit’s decision in
Medidata and its potential impact on insurance coverage litigation landscape). In this article, the
authors describe Medidata as “one of the most closely watched social engineering cases,” affirming
the lower court’s decision to find coverage. Id. For further discussion of Medidata and the how it
diverted from the majority of courts’ determinations in finding coverage under a computer fraud
policy provision for a social engineering fraud loss, see supra note 29 and accompanying text.
112. See Medidata, 729 F. App’x at 118–19 (holding that, under de novo review, fraudster
changing appearance of email to impersonate high ranking superior in company constituted
“violation of the integrity of the computer system” (quoting Universal Am. Corp. v. Nat’l Union
Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa., 37 N.E.3d 78, 81 (N.Y. 2015)). Furthermore, the Second Circuit
instituted a proximate cause standard and found that the lower court erred in its determination that
coverage for the social engineering fraud claim was improper because the “direct” policy language
allowed an instance like this, in which a computer proximately caused the chain of events giving
rise to the losses, even though the employees themselves effectuated the transfer. See id. at 119.
113. See id. at 118 (describing executive impersonation scheme used by criminals).
114. See id. at 118–19.
115. See id. (explaining proximate cause of losses and holding that “New York law does not
have so strict a rule about intervening actors” to find that social engineering losses were not direct
loss).
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B. Hook, Line, and Sinker: The Sixth Circuit Reinforces the Trend in American Tooling
Only one week later on July 13, 2018, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed a district court ruling in favor of an insurer in a social engineering fraud
claim to find coverage in American Tooling Center, Inc. v. Travelers Casualty and Surety Co.
of America.116 In deciding this case, the court weighed in on the circuit split, deciding
that a vendor impersonation scam was covered under computer fraud.117 The Sixth
Circuit held that various exclusions, which barred coverage in other jurisdictions,
did not preclude coverage for the social engineering fraud scheme. 118
Although the court acknowledged the paucity of Michigan law dealing with
interpretation of “direct,” the court adopted the notion that a “direct” loss is one
resulting from an “immediate or proximate” cause.119 The court contended that “[i]f
[the insurer] had wished to limit the definition of computer fraud . . . it could have
done so.”120 Yet, the court quickly dismissed the assertions that several other policy
exclusions were the insurer’s way of limiting the computer fraud policy. 121
Despite the tide shifting to find coverage for insureds suffering from social
engineering fraud losses under computer fraud provisions, the Ninth Circuit has
declined to follow Medidata and American Tooling in subsequently issued opinions
dealing with social engineering fraud.122 Nevertheless, decisions recently issued in

116. 895 F.3d 455 (6th Cir. 2018) (explaining holding of court to find that social engineering
fraud scheme fit within policy’s computer fraud provision).
117. See id. at 465 (holding that social engineering loss “is covered by the Policy and none of
the asserted Policy exclusions apply”).
118. See id. at 463–65 (reversing district court’s decision and holding that company suffered
“direct loss”, scheme constituted computer fraud under policy, and policy exclusions did not apply
here even though some policy exclusions had decisively precluded coverage in other circuits). For
further discussion of the policy exclusions relevant to American Tooling and the court’s rationale in
holding that the policy exclusions did not apply, see supra note 30 and accompanying text.
119. See Am. Tooling, 895 F.3d at 460, 463 (emphasis added) (declining to accept insurer’s
argument in brief that, under established Michigan law applicable to interpretation of word “direct”
in context of employee-fidelity bonds, court should apply narrower definition). Although the court
acknowledged the scarcity of Michigan law dealing with interpretation of the word “direct,” it noted
that the insurer supported its brief with a plethora of cases interpreting “direct” in the context of
employee-fidelity bonds. See id. These cases applied a narrower definition of “direct,” and the
court posited that the lower court’s decision, which granted summary judgment in favor of insureds,
is based upon interpretation of “direct” in this precise context. See id. Instead, the court cited to
an unpublished opinion and instituted the court’s definition of “direct” as signaling “immediate”
or “proximate.” See id. at 460 (citing Acorn Inv. Co. v. Mich. Basic Prop. Ins. Ass’n, No. 284234,
2009 WL 2952677, at *2 (Mich. Ct. App. Sept. 15, 2009). The court then concluded that the
company “immediately lost its money when it transferred the approximately $834,000 to the
impersonator; there was no intervening event.” Id.
120. Id. at 462 (opining that insurer’s “attempt to limit the definition of ‘Computer Fraud’
to hacking and similar behaviors in which a nefarious party somehow gains access to and/or
controls the insured’s computer is not well-founded”).
121. For further discussion of the American Tooling policy exclusions that the court found
were not applicable to preclude coverage, see supra note 30 and accompanying text.
122. See Tidewater Holdings, Inc. v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 389 F. Supp. 3d 920 (W.D.
Wash. 2019) (holding social engineering fraud losses not covered under computer fraud policy
provisions); see also Medidata Sols., Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 729 F. App’x 117, 118–19 (2d Cir. 2018)
(holding, unlike the Ninth Circuit, that social engineering losses were covered under “computer
fraud” provision); Am. Tooling, 895 F.3d at 465 (holding social engineering losses were not
precluded by various exclusions to “computer fraud” provision).
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district courts indicate a growing preference toward a looser standard in interpreting
“computer fraud” provisions.123 The impact of these decisions, not only upon social
engineering fraud losses but also upon interpretation of “direct” language in
insurance policies, will become clear as insurers and insureds react to the opinions. 124
IV. DON’T TAKE THE BAIT: WHY THE TREND TOWARD COVERAGE FOR
INSUREDS DOES NOT SOLVE THE ISSUE
Courts should discontinue the current trend toward finding coverage for
insureds suffering from social engineering fraud losses under computer fraud policy
provisions because the loosened proximate cause analysis in these cases departs
from the standard method of insurance policy interpretation. 125 Because social
engineering presents an entirely different and more complicated threat, courts
should allow insurance companies to provide separate coverage for social
engineering.126 This will allow insurers to appropriately assess the monetary risks of
social engineering claims and will allow insureds to be confidently protected against
these schemes without legal ambiguity.127
Both Mediata and American Tooling strained to shoehorn social engineering
coverage within computer fraud provisions, abandoning precedential methods of
insurance policy interpretation.128 First, the court in Medidata interpreted the
criminals’ spoofing and email formatting to appear as though it was sent from
123. See generally Childrens Place, Inc. v. Great Am. Ins. Co., No. 181-1963 (ES) (JAD), 2019
WL 1857118, at *3–4 (D.N.J. Apr. 25, 2019) (denying motion to dismiss due to factual issue of
whether hacker’s activities could be interpreted as infiltration pursuant to policy language and
because denying coverage would produce absurd result). But see Tidewater Holdings, 389 F. Supp. 3d
at 925 (holding that social engineering losses where fraudulent supplemental funds transfer was
initiated were not covered under “computer fraud” provision and were precluded by original
exclusions in main policy, which were subdivided so each specific exclusion referenced limited
policy portion).
124. See generally Joshua Dobiac, I Came, I Saw, I Underwrote: D & O Liability Insurance’s Past
Underwriting Practices and Potential Future Directions, 14 CONN. INS. L.J. 487 (2008) (explaining
underwriting process and how underwriters assess risk). Though this article deals particularly with
Directors & Officers liability insurance, it provides an excellent explanation of the cycle insurance
writers go through to constantly assess risk and update their policies. See id. at 495–96. To assess
risk and update polices, insurance writers look to court decisions and legal trends to determine the
risk factors associated with specific policy provisions. See id. at 488–89.
125. See generally Park & O’Neill, supra note 8 (describing shift in new court decisions that
interpret identical policy provisions in different manners). In this article, the authors compare the
various pre-Medidata decisions, post-Medidata decisions, and policy language with each other and
continually come to the same conclusion: “court[s] examining similar policy language . . . come to
a different conclusion.” Id. at 8. Therefore, at this point in time, there is an inherent inconsistency
in social engineering fraud loss interpretations under computer fraud policy provisions. See id. at
4–5 (noting various interpretations of provisions).
126. See Bird & Dorvilier, supra note 14, at 16 (discussing insurers making social engineering
fraud coverage available to insureds). For more information regarding the methods criminals use
to carry out social engineering fraud schemes and how they differ from hacking methods, see supra
notes 38–66.
127. For further discussion of how companies may deem adding social engineering fraud
coverage as premature in light of the subject legal trend and therefore avoid creating separate policy
provisions, see infra note 142 and accompanying text.
128. For further discussion of why these cases diverged from the typical method of narrow
insurance policy interpretation, see infra notes 129–35 and accompanying text.
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Medidata’s president to constitute “fraudulent entry of data or deletion of data from
a computer system.”129 Despite the fact that this provision clearly denotes direct
taking by hacking, the court’s finding that merely receiving an email with a deceptive
address satisfies this definition demonstrates a misconception of what traditionally
constitutes a computer system breach.130 Even if the fraudsters had gained access to
the email server to communicate the fraudulent instructions, the monetary losses
would still not have stemmed directly from this “entry”; instead, this provision
contemplates, in light of previously discussed ISO language, the entry or deletion of
data which on its own causes the loss, rather than an employee completing the
process.131
Immediately after Medidata, the Sixth Circuit held similarly in American Tooling.132
By basing its definition of “direct” upon an unpublished opinion and passing over
jurisprudence in Michigan that clearly found “direct” to denote “immediate,” the
Sixth Circuit broadly interpreted “direct” beyond its plain and common meaning. 133
Furthermore, by opining that “[i]f [the insurer] had wished to limit the definition of
computer fraud to [hacking] it could have done so,” the Sixth Circuit discounted the
history of computer fraud coverage language.134 Additionally, the court overlooked
underwriters’ inability to anticipate the recent rise of social engineering; in other
129. See Medidata Sols., Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 729 F. App’x 117, 118–19 (2d Cir. 2018)
(describing method through which criminals changed email format and courts’ interpretation of
this practice as hacking computer system). Although changing the email format or making it appear
a certain way necessarily involves coding, the court categorized this practice as computer hacking
in opposition to other courts’ decisions. See id. In finding that the email spoofing caused a change
to Medidata’s computer system, the district court elaborated:
[T]he thief constructed messages in Internet Message Format (“IMF”) which the parties
compare to a physical letter containing a return address. The IMF message was
transmitted to Gmail in an electronic envelope called a Simple Mail Transfer Protocol
(“SMTP”). Much like a physical envelope, the SMTP Envelope contained a recipient
and a return address. To mask the true origin of the spoofed emails, the thief embedded a
computer code.
Medidata Sols., Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 268 F. Supp. 3d 471, 473 (S.D.N.Y. 2017), aff’d, 729 F. App’x
117 (2d Cir. 2018) (emphasis added) (citations omitted). The court therefore equated this
“computer code” to change the email format with hacking. See id.
130. Compare Interactive Commc’ns Int’l, Inc. v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 731 F. App’x 929, 932
(11th Cir. 2018) with Medidata, 729 F. App’x at 117. The Eleventh Circuit stated: “[t]he question is
whether the fraudsters ‘use[d]’ both phones and computers to perpetrate their scheme—namely,
using the phones to manipulate—and thereby use—the IVR computers.” Interactive Commc’ns, 731
F. App’x at 932. Therefore, the Eleventh Circuit, like other courts, found that manipulation of the
computer is crucial to a computer fraud claim. See id.
131. For further discussion of the ISO and the coverage contemplated in drafting the ISO’s
standard policy language for “computer fraud,” see supra notes 73–84 and accompanying text.
132. See Am. Tooling Ctr. v. Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am., 895 F.3d 455, 460 (6th Cir.
2018) (finding American Tooling Center experienced “direct loss”); cf. Direct, WEBSTER’S NEW
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1939) (defining “direct” as “marked by the absence of an
intervening agency or influence”).
133. See Am. Tooling, 895 F.3d at 459–61 (explaining “direct” word interpretation); see also
Acorn Inv. Co. v. Mich. Basic Prop. Ins. Ass’n, No. 284234, 2009 WL 2952677, at *2 (Mich. Ct.
App. Sept. 15, 2009) (defining “direct” as “immediate”). For further discussion of “direct”
interpretation under its plain and common meaning, see supra notes 85–104.
134. See Am. Tooling, 895 F.3d at 462 (explaining why policy should be read to include
situation at issue). For a further discussion of the history of the computer fraud coverage form and
the various exclusions that have been added since its inception to accommodate and specify
coverage, see supra notes 67–78 and accompanying text.
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words, the underwriters could not have anticipated the need to distinguish terms
within computer fraud provisions from aspects of social engineering fraud because
these risks were not contemplated—or were not sufficiently prevalent to warrant
consideration—during the policy’s drafting.135
Courts must respect the insurance policy’s unique nature because there is a
strong policy argument for preserving underwriting techniques and respecting the
relevant markets available for insurers to create different coverage for distinct types
of risks.136 The insurer’s reasonable expectations are largely based on projections
and statistics surrounding policy language to determine their risk level. 137 Thus, the
recent expansion of terms like “direct,” coupled with courts’ disregard of clear
exclusion language, will make it difficult for insurers to accurately determine rates
for coverage as well as fund allocation for riskier provisions. 138
By keeping social engineering fraud distinct from losses arising directly from a
computer, courts will induce underwriters to add separate social engineering fraud
coverage to crime and fidelity policies. 139 In turn, companies who want to protect
against this type of crime will have the assurance of coverage.140 Due to the
135. For further discussion of the importance of insurance providers anticipating the risks
associated with their policies and how courts evaluate the reasonable expectations of the insurer
and insured, see supra notes 67–84 and accompanying text.
136. See generally Larsson, supra note 69 (describing how courts assess reasonable expectations
of insurer, especially out of respect for unique nature of insurance market). Although it should
not be the policy argument guiding already issued insurance policies, there is a market for insurers
to include or give companies the option of social engineering fraud coverage. See id. As these
losses grow increasingly larger, and arguably could surpass the average loss amounts of those merely
from computer fraud due to hacking, insurers should have the right to distinguish computer fraud
coverage from social engineering fraud coverage. See id. Other commentators argue the trend
toward providing coverage for social engineering fraud losses under computer fraud provisions
“undermines insurers’ interest in uniformity in the meaning of their policy forms.” Bird &
Dorvilier, supra note 14, at 16 (warning insurers may see these newer decisions as reason to “rewrite
the computer fraud provisions to explicitly limit coverage to attacks on the insured’s computer
system itself”).
137. For further discussion of how insurers calculate risk and draft policies accordingly, see
supra notes 67–84 and accompanying text.
138. See generally Dobiac, supra note 124, at 495 (describing underwriting cycle of assessing
risk). The author explains the underwriting cycle and how underwriters assess risk in selecting
policy drafting language. See id.
139. See 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2018) (displaying preeminence of traditional approach to
“computer fraud” as third-party accessing information through hacking, as it does not include
activities that could be considered social engineering, and therefore coverage for this would need
to be added separately into policies). This federal statute focuses on incriminating fraud and related
activity regarding computers. See id. The statute’s language echoes the pre-2018 majority stance
on whether social engineering fraud constitutes computer fraud and gives a definite answer: no.
See id. In pertinent part, the computer fraud statute forbids one from “knowingly and with intent
to defraud, access[ing] a protected computer without authorization;” therefore, the statute would
not apply to the authorized transactions involved in social engineering fraud schemes. Id. §§ (a)(2)–
(4). To constitute federal criminal computer fraud, one must obtain access to a computer without
authorization. See id. Arguably, in social engineering fraud schemes, the perpetrator’s goal is not
to access the computer and obtain information independently without the involvement of an
employee. See id. While this statute is not binding on courts’ interpretations of the policy language
found in insurance policies, this statute establishes that a common understanding of computer
fraud necessitates hacking and does not include social engineering. See id.
140. See id. § (e)(1) (defining “computer” under statute favorable to insurance policies
looking to clarify coverage). The United States Code provides the following definition of
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ambiguity created by courts loosening the standards used to interpret insurance
policies, these decisions, which seemingly benefit insureds, may ultimately create
more harm than good.141
V. BIGGER FISH TO FRY: THE POTENTIAL UNFORESEEN IMPACTS OF THE
CURRENT TREND TOWARD COVERAGE
Although policy underwriters are adding social engineering fraud provisions to
insurers’ standard crime and fidelity policies, companies will likely find that adding
this coverage to their policies is premature in light of the trending decisions favoring
insureds and affording them social engineering coverage under existing computer
fraud provisions.142 Believing themselves to be protected under their current
policies, companies may elect to forego additional coverage options that specifically
deal with social engineering fraud.143 Yet, if the claim is litigated in a court that
adheres to narrower insurance policy interpretation methods or the social
engineering fraud is instigated by phone, fax, or an in-person interaction, the insured
will be left defenseless.144 Furthermore, a lack of legal uniformity for businesses
“computer” within the meaning of the statute as it relates to fraudulent criminal activities:
an electronic, magnetic, optical, electrochemical, or other high speed data processing
device performing logical, arithmetic, or storage functions, and includes any data storage
facility or communications facility directly related to or operating in conjunction with
such device, but such term does not include an automated typewriter or typesetter, a
portable hand held calculator, or other similar device[.]
Id.; see also John R. Felice, The Computer Crime Coverage Conundrum, HERMES NETBURN (2013),
https://www.hermesnetburn.com/E40D62/assets/
files/News/JRFThe%20Computer%20Crime%20Coverage%20Conundrum.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4FEKPEFA] (noting that, because technology is constantly evolving, insureds may not have full coverage
under computer fraud provisions). In this paper, the author deals with the problem of identifying
what, precisely, constitutes a computer. See id. Even if the court agrees with the notion that
computer fraud denotes hacking, the author questions whether an employee’s hacked smartphone
that gives away information or funds to a criminal, for example, constitute computer fraud. See id.
The author posits that this difficult question will, until insurers more clearly define coverage and
distinguish between different types of fraud, “continue to present challenges that can be overcome
by the addition of definitions establishing the scope of the coverage provided. Until such time, the
arguments for and against finding a covered loss resulting from ‘use of a computer’ remain as broad
as the imagination will allow.” Id.
141. See Bird & Dorvilier, supra note 14, at 16 (stating that in response to more lenient
coverage decisions, few newer social engineering provisions written by insurers have come with
various exclusions and will likely not limit continuance of such claims under provisions for
computer fraud). As stated by the authors, due to the circuit split, they “do not foresee the
availability of social engineering fraud coverage deterring insureds from making claims for
computer fraud coverage.” Id. at 16. Therefore, coverage under computer fraud policies will
remain an important issue until the circuit split is resolved. See id. at 17.
142. See id. at 16 (explaining impact recent court decisions will likely have on insurance
policies). As previously discussed, companies will likely abstain from taking further precautions to
insure themselves against these types of losses if they have computer fraud coverage, as the circuit
split and trend toward coverage suggests that changing their policy or purchasing extra social
engineering coverage may be premature. See id.
143. See Selarnick et al., supra note 35, at 483–84 (noting that, while companies should take
precautions, social engineering fraud interpretation under existing policy provisions is developing
field of litigation that companies should consider when negotiating policy provisions).
144. For further discussion of cases in which courts found coverage was precluded for social
engineering losses under “computer fraud” provisions, see supra notes 79–102 and accompanying
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working across state lines will make it difficult for companies to select adequate
crime and fidelity insurance coverage.145
Additionally, cases interpreting the meticulously worded coverage provisions in
all types of policies may look at the more lenient decisions and expand coverage
beyond the enumerated terms.146 Courts already have begun to cite these cases and
their loosened policy language interpretation in subsequent decisions.147 While these
decisions have and will continue to change the insurance coverage litigation
landscape, they especially will affect claims implicating technology.148 As technology
becomes ubiquitous, it is extremely important for courts to extract the nature of the
crime or legal action at issue from the technology used.149 In doing so, insurers will
have the freedom to develop and adapt policy language to account for an
increasingly virtual world.150

text.

145. For further discussion of how courts’ interpretation of insurance policies affects
businesses, see supra notes 67–84 and accompanying text.
146. See Selarnick et al., supra note 35, at 485 (explaining efficient proximate cause doctrine,
which applies to losses resulting from both covered and uncovered causes). By expanding “direct”
to a proximate cause standard, and without seeking guidance from legal doctrines applying a
proximate cause standard in insurance policy provisions, courts bypass rhetorical methods used to
comb through murky proximate cause issues; this may now be relevant as insurers may narrow
coverage and social engineering losses may be categorized as caused by both a covered and
uncovered type of loss. See id.
147. See, e.g., Childrens Place, Inc. v. Great Am. Ins. Co., No. 18-11963 (ES) (JAD), 2019
WL 1857118, at *3 (D.N.J. Apr. 25, 2019) (denying motion to dismiss because court found that
whether hacker’s activities could be interpreted as infiltration pursuant to policy language was
factual issue and therefore denying coverage would produce an absurd result).
148. See David Hollander, Position of Influence, Beyond Traditional Roles, INS. & TECH., Nov.
2012, at 11, https://dsimg.ubm-us.net/envelope/282372/477953/insurance-technologynovember-2012-elite-8_2780398.pdf [https://perma.cc/7FKA-9XCN] (stating that “the demand
for technology-enabled change throughout the [insurance] business has never been greater”).
149. See Schmookler & Kahler, supra note 7 (questioning whether manipulation of humans,
as is carried out through social engineering schemes, constitutes computer fraud). As is detailed in
their article, social engineering fraud is nothing new. See id. at 4. This extremely general fraud
category preys upon human emotions and favors human weaknesses to gain access to information
and funds. See id. at 5. The article acknowledges that “[t]he growing use of technology-enabled
processes exposes a wide variety of businesses to cybercrime[,]” and technology is merely a means
of achieving that crime; one example is identity theft. Id. at 1. However, the focus should be on
the direct nature of these crimes through the computer, as they are extremely different from
schemes requiring employee involvement. See id. at 40.
150. See generally Doug Bonderud, The Evolution of Technology: From Unusual to Ubiquitous,
PROGRESS (June 20, 2016), https://blog.ipswitch.com/evolution-technology-unusual-ubiquitous
[https://perma.cc/R88P-TTWR] (detailing technology’s ubiquity in modern life and how this
notion will only increase over time).
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